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ABSTRACT
Producer services such as managerial and engineering consulting can provide domestic firms
with the substantial benefits of specialized knowledge that would be costly in terms of both time and
money for domestic firms to develop on their own.  These intermediate services are often non-traded,
or costly to trade, and are best transferred through foreign direct investment.  This has important
implications for public policy since policies that impact on foreign direct investment are often quite
different from those that impact on trade in goods.  We develop a model of these services in this
paper.  Results show that: (1) while imported services are partial-equilibrium substitutes for domestic
skilled  labor,  they  may  be  general-equilibrium  complements,  (2)  imported  services  lead  to
differential productivity effects in final goods production so that, for example, the pattern of trade
in goods can reverse when FDI is permitted, and (3) the optimal tax on FDI (which we do not
advocate as a practical matter) is negative.
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1. Scope of the Paper
How important are restraints on foreign providers of producer services for welfare and growth in
developing countries? With the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) having been
incorporated into the World Trade Organization and the agreement to discuss these issues after the
Uruguay Round (possibly as part of a New Round), this question has taken on an important policy
dimension.
A growing body of evidence and economic theory suggests that the close availability of a diverse
set of business services is important for economic growth. The key idea in the literature is that a diverse
set (or higher quality set) of business services allows downstream users to purchase a quality adjusted unit
of business services at lower cost.  As early as the 1960s, the urban and regional economics literature
(e.g., Greenfield, 1966; Jacobs, 1969, 1984; Chinitz 1961; Vernon 1960; Stanback, 1979) recognized the
importance of non-tradable intermediate goods (primarily producer services produced under conditions of
increasing returns to scale) as an important source of agglomeration externalities which account for the
formation of cities and industrial complexes, and explanations of the difference in economic performance
across regions.
The more recent economic geography literature (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1992; Fujita,
Krugman and Venables, 1999) has also focused on the fact that related economic activity is economically
concentrated due to agglomeration externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, ceramic tiles
in Sassuolo, Italy).  Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms
operating in economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation.
Caballero and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in industries when output of its input
supplying industries increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are
clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor countries are
spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for inputs1Empirical work has traditionally treated producer services as non-traded. See Kravis and Lipsey (1988).
Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is provided at a distance.  
2Business services enhance the productivity of final goods production which expand and in turn demand
more business services. This is a virtuous cycle of forward and backward externalities. 
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since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where
a large variety of such inputs are located.
As the urban economics literature suggested, we believe that the most natural place to look for
the source of agglomeration economies is producer services. Intermediate goods with low transportation
costs can not play the role required by the urban economics or economic geography theories, since if
transportation costs are low there is little advantage to being close to these input suppliers. But many
business services are either non-traded internationally or provided at much higher costs from a distance so
that there are significant disadvantages to a user of these services from being far from the core location
of these activities.1 Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom (Birmingham,
Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought from
suppliers within the same region.   He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the
local availability of producer services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local
availability of producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors. 
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that we numerically simulate to
quantitatively assess the importance of liberalization of restraints on foreign providers of producer
services. Based on the evidence we have mentioned, we make three key assumptions in our model: (1)
producer services are non-traded internationally; (2) a larger variety of producer services lower the
quality adjusted costs of these services for downstream industries;2 and (3) producer services are
produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale. We have already discussed the evidence for
stylized facts (1) and (2). Faini (1984) surveys the evidence on increasing returns to scale in producer3Intermediate goods with high transportation costs could also be a source of agglomeration economies,
since clearly with sufficiently high transportation costs goods can become non-traded also.
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services. As emphasized by Romer (1990), many professional services are information intensive which in
itself suggests increasing returns to scale given the non-rival property of information as an input in
production.  
We prefer to remain somewhat vague regarding a generic definition of producer services.3  We
shall, however, provide some elaboration since it explains some of the nuances of our model. The types of
activities we are interested in  include:  (1) managerial services, which improve organizational and
decision-making efficiency.  (2) engineering services, which improve technical efficiency and product
quality.  (3) financial services (not actual trade in capital) which provide expertise in financial
management and decision making.  (4) marketing services which improve firms' abilities to sell or
purchase other goods and services.  (5) information services in which the buyer receives some type of
information or knowledge not just listed.
We believe these types of services represent a substantial share of the GDP of modern
economies. Based on national income statistics, all services are about 60 percent of GDP in OECD
countries, and are about 50 to 55 percent of GDP in middle income countries. Business services (which is
perhaps the best indicator of the types of services on which we focus in this paper) are about one-third of
the total of all services. See UNCTAD (1994, tables A.1 and B.1).
Many routine services, such as cleaning services have been left off this list quite deliberately. 
While unskilled-labor-intensive services might be quantitatively important, they are not generally traded
internationally.  Firms incur costs of doing business abroad, and as such must have advantages over
domestic firms.  Thus we will disregard a wide range of routine services, and concentrate on the list just
presented.
Several concepts emerge from this list.  First, as emphasized above, our services are intermediate-4-
inputs.  Second, the services we are interested in generally involve an exchange of knowledge, which has
been accumulated by the seller through previous investments.  This implies two separate characteristics: 
the services of interest here are (a) intensive in skilled labor and other knowledge-based assets, and (b)
involve some sort of scale economies: once painfully or slowly learned, knowledge can be supplied at low
marginal cost.
Third, these services are generally customized to some extent, solving particular problems of the
buyer, and they are not generally good substitutes for the services of other firms.  Thus there is firm-level
product differentiation.  There may also be differentiation by firm nationality: two US management
consulting firms may be better substitutes for one another than a US firm is for a Russian firm.  
Finally, our services generally require a personal presence in a country or at least personal
contact and discussions between the service provider and the client.   In particular, restrictions on goods
trade only affect service trade indirectly, while restrictions on foreign investment and the movement of
business personnel have major, direct impacts.  Note in particular that insofar as many services of interest
are intensive in knowledge capital or knowledge-based assets, firms may insist on proprietary control of
these assets to prevent their dissipation.  Laws and regulations prohibiting foreign investment may thus
rule out "trade" in many services; i.e., firms may only be willing to provide their services internally within
the firm, not through arm's length contractual arrangements.
In summary then, we are interested in services have the following general characteristics.
(a) intermediate goods
(b) intensive in skilled labor and other knowledge capital
(c) produced with increasing returns.
(d) differentiated by firm and possibly by firm nationality
(e) subject to high or prohibitive transactions costs from barriers to foreign ownership,
movement of business personnel, etc. -5-
"Imported" services with these characteristics offer a number of important advantages to
developing or transition economies.  First, they may complement rather than substitute for domestic
producer services, the differentiated-product characteristic just mentioned.  Second, they economize on
scarce domestic skilled labor which is then freed for other uses, the factor-intensity property noted above. 
This second property suggests that imported producer services might harm domestic skilled labor and its
accumulation in the long run.  But combined with the first "complements" property, this is far from obvious
as we shall show below.
Third, imported services allow countries to obtain in the present expertise that is not otherwise
available and would take considerable time and/or resources to develop, the scale economies property.  In
a static model, this could be captured by simple scale economies with fixed costs in terms of skilled labor,
or in a dynamic model by a learning-by-doing or investment process which requires a time lag between
skilled-labor inputs and service output.
Fourth, imported services may provide crucial missing inputs which allow a country to produce
and export goods in which the country has a natural comparative advantage except for the missing input. 
This has the potential for huge surplus value.  The Arabian gulf may have had huge oil supplies, but
expertise was required to bring it to market.  A few hundred million dollars worth of foreign expertise
likely had a return of many billions of dollars.
The purpose of this paper is to take several steps toward incorporating the types of producer
services just discussed into applied general equilibrium models.  The first step in this process is to adopt a
formal theoretical approach.  Our formulation will build on existing work, including Markusen (1989),
Francois (1990a,b), and Stibora and de Vaal (1995).  The second, and more original, step of this paper will
be to obtain a quantitative assessment of the impact of this approach by embedding it in both static and
dynamic applied general-equilibrium models.  The static model considers the implications of FDI in a
model where the supply of domestic skilled labor is fixed. There have been some prior numerical efforts-6-
to quantitatively assess the implications of international liberalization against foreign service providers
(Brown et al., 1996; Robinson and Wang, 1999).  But these studies have not required a domestic presence
by foreign service providers.  Rather they treated service sectors as tradable and assumed that there
were tariffs or the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers against foreign services that acted to restrain
imported services in a manner similar to tariffs on goods trade.  In our approach, liberalization of the
restraints on the inputs to foreign service providers will expand the domestic provision of foreign services,
but will have no impact in the prior approaches.
Our dynamic model provides a means of assessing the time and disruption involved in moving
from an initial equilibrium to a new steady-state equilibrium by modeling the transition under consistent
expectations by firms and consumers.  There are two reasons that the transitional dynamics are of
interest.  First, given an assumption of imperfect intersectoral immobility of existing workers, there are
potentially important equity consequences of reform.  Second, if there are wage rigidities or other
distortions in the economy that slow the adjustment of labor, FDI liberalization may generate transitional
unemployment losses which could offset some fraction of the efficiency gains offered by the reform.  For
these reasons, in our dynamic extension we focus on adjustment in the stock of skilled labor within the
economy, assuming that existing workers may be unable to move directly into the FDI enclave.
We believe these template models should provide a useful starting point for the analysis of these
issues in future applications with real data.  Before proceeding, we will mention of a couple of interesting
results which may induce the reader to continue.  First, we use a static model to show that liberalization of
rules to permit inward FDI in producer services may imply that these services are general-equilibrium
complements to domestic skilled labor, even though they appear to substitute for domestic skilled labor in a
partial-equilibrium sense.  Thus, it is likely that FDI may foster the accumulation of skilled workers. 
Second, allowing inward FDI in producer services may significantly affect the pattern of trade in goods. 
As in the "key input" argument above, these services may reverse the direction of trade, permitting the4Below we introduce a composite input that must be imported for FDI to occur; this input may be
partly primary factors.
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host country to successfully export advanced products.  Third, we find that the transitional process may
involve substantial changes in the market for skilled labor, particularly if we assume that workers in FDI
enterprises require specialized education. These effects depend on assumptions regarding the productivity
of older skilled workers in the new market for services.  If all workers in the new services sector must be
new graduates, the reform imposes a significant burden on older workers, and the transition process could
take a number of years to complete.
The order of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we lay out the basic theoretical model
and some simplifying assumptions.  The following section describes the dynamic extension of the model
which is used to examine the economic transition following liberalization.  Section 4 presents a number of
implementational issues involved in the analysis, and section 5 describes some of the results of numerical
simulations.  Section 6 concludes.  Three appendices, available separately, present GAMS source code
for the models employed in this paper.
2. Modelling Trade and FDI in Producer Services
Our basic approach will be to model producer services as intermediate inputs.  These
intermediate inputs will be differentiated from one another and may also be differentiated according to
whether or not they are produced domestically or by foreign firms.  Both types of services are produced
with increasing returns to scale due to fixed costs.  
There will be two final goods, X and Y, and two primary factors available on the domestic market,
S and L.4  S will denote skilled labor and L will denote all other factors, aggregated into a composite factor
to simplify the model.  S and L are in fixed aggregate supply and immobile between countries.  The
production function for Y is written in Cobb-Douglas form to facilitate comparison with X, but in the-8-






Services are an intermediate input into X production.  The composite of all services inputs Z enters








Later, in some illustrative simulations, we will assume that in direct S and L requirements, X is skilled-labor
intensive relative to Y, in the sense that  .  "x/$x > "y/$y
Services are produced by imperfectly competitive firms. There is a one to one correspondence
between the firm and their differentiated service varieties. There are both domestic and foreign firms
producing services inputs.  Zx is a CES function of ZD and ZM, each of which is in turn a CES function of
the individual ZD and ZM varieties, zdi and zmj respectively.
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where nd and nm are the number of domestic and imported service varieties, respectively. The elasticities
of substitution within product groups are:  Fd =1/(1-*) and Fm =1/(1-,). We require that * and , are
between 0 and 1, which implies that the elasticities of substitution within product groups exceed unity. 
Domestic intermediate inputs ZD are produced using domestic skilled labor and the composite
factor.  Imported services ZM are produced from domestic skilled labor the composite domestic factor 
and a composite imported factor.  Examples of these imported inputs, which will be denoted V, are:-9-
specialized technical expertise, advanced technology, management expertise and marketing expertise. The
variable V is thus quite general and denotes a key difference between foreign and domestic production
structures.    zdi and zmi are produced with a fixed and a variable cost.  
Because of the two components of cost, it is normal to express technologies for these
differentiated goods by a cost function rather than by a production function.  Let CD and CM be the cost
function for producing individual domestic and foreign varieties. We impose a symmetry assumption within
firm types, i.e., all foreign firms have identical cost structures, and all domestic firms that operate have cost
structures identical to other domestic firms.  cd and cm represent unit variable cost functions and fd and fm
represent the fixed costs functions for domestic and foreign varieties respectively.  Let r be the price of S,
w be the price of L, and pv be the price of V.  Cost functions for domestic and foreign intermediates are
thus:
C D(r, w,zd) ’ cd(r,w)zd % fd(r, w) (5)
C M(r,w,pv, zm) ’ cm(r, w,pv)zm % fm(r,w,pv) (6)
Let nd and nm as variables refer to the number of domestic and foreign service firms active in equilibrium. 
Recalling that the derivatives of cost function with respect to the price of factor i is the input demand for
factor i, the market clearing equations for S and L can then be written as:















the unskilled wage rate and the rental price of skilled labor, respectively.  (By Shephard’s lemma, these are-10-
the compensated demand functions.)
The demand side of the economy consists of a representative consumer, who derives income from
factor supplies and possibly from tax revenues (net of subsidies).  Let subscripts c and p distinguish
consumption and production of X and Y.  Preferences of the representative consumer are given by
U ’ U(Xc,Yc) (9)
The model is closed with a trade balance condition that requires that net exports of X and Y equal
net payments for foreign services. Let px
* and py
*  denote the world prices of X and Y (which may differ
from domestic prices if there are taxes or subsidies).  Trade balance is given by:
p
(
x (Xp & Xc) % p
(
y (Yp & Yc) & p
(
v V ’ 0 (10)
where the demand for foreign services is given by the number of foreign services times the derivative of
the cost function for a given foreign service with respect to the cost of imports::
V ’ nm C
M
pv (11)
Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of real flows within the economy.  Domestic factors S and
L are supplied to four production activities.  One of these, foreign producer services uses imported inputs
from abroad, V.  Services are inputs to production of X along with S and L.  Domestic production of X or Y
may then be supplied to export markets in exchange for the other good and/or as payments for V.  A
portion of X and Y will be supplied to the domestic market where it is consumed with imports.
To simplify the interpretation of results, we assume “large-group monopolistic competition.”  That
is, individual firms believe they are too small to influence the composite price of their group. As we will
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(16)       
Let px denote the domestic price of X and pzmi denote the price received by the producer of a
representative zmi.  Since final X production is assumed competitive,  pzmi  is the value of the marginal
product of zmi in producing X.
(17) () [] pp S L Z z m zm x x x x x x i i
xx x x =− − +
−− − −− 1Z D Z M Z M  
1 1 αβ
α γ βα β γ γ γ ε ε
1
Revenue of an individual zmi producer is price times quantity.
(18) () [] zm p p S L Z ZM ZM zm iz m x x x x x x i i
xx x x =− − +
−− − − 1Z D αβ
α γ βα β γ γ γ ε ε
1 1
Large-group monopolistic competition is the assumption that an individual firm views Zx as fixed or-12-
() [] MR p S L Z D ZM ZM zm p zm x x x x x x i zm i
xx x x
i =− − + =
−− − −− 1 αβ ε ε
α γ βα β γ γ γ ε ε Ζ
1 1 1
parametric, and here by extension views ZM and ZD as fixed.  Thus, the individual firm views all variables
on the right hand side of equation (18) as fixed except for its own output zmi.  This implies that marginal 
revenue takes on a very simple form.
(19)
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost implies that the ratio of price to marginal cost is simply 1/,.
We have assumed that all foreign varieties have an identical cost structure and the demand for all
foreign varieties is identical. These “symmetry” assumptions imply that the output and price of all foreign
firms that operate will be identical. We can thus write  zmi = zm and  pzmi =  pzm for all i.  Similar
conclusions follow for domestic firms.
 Then equilibrium for a symmetric group of service firms (zm or zd) is found as the solution to two
equations and two unknowns.  One equation is the individual firm's optimization condition, marginal revenue
equals marginal cost.  A second condition arising from the free-entry condition is that price equals average
cost.  This condition determines the number of firms in equilibrium.  For our type-zm firms, these two
conditions are given as follows (with corresponding equations for the type-zd firms).
MR ’ MC: pzm,’cm(r,w,pv) (20)
pzm ’ AC: pzm ’ cm(r,w, pv) % fm(r, w,pv)/zm (21)
Solving these equations to find zm, output per firm, we get:
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The output of a given variety is larger when fixed costs are larger relative to marginal costs (scale
economies are larger) and when the varieties are better substitutes. Similar results apply for domestic type
firms.
Dual to the output indices in equation 4 are cost functions. When firms minimize the cost of
purchasing foreign (domestic) varieties, a cost of a unit of the composite foreign (domestic) input ZM (ZD)
is:
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1&F d Fd ’ 1
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where pzdi   is the price of the output of a domestic firm and nd and nm are the number of domestic and
foreign firms. 
 
Substituting the symmetry of the equilibrium into the cost functions for a unit of ZM or ZD, implies
that CM and CD can be written as:










Since the elasticities of substitution exceed unity, the cost of obtaining an aggregate unit of foreign or
domestic services decreases as the number of varieties increases. That is, additional varieties convey an
externality on the final goods sector X by lowering its costs of obtaining a unit of composite services. The
elasticity of the cost of a composite unit of foreign services with respect to the number of foreign varieties
is (1-Fm). Thus, an additional foreign variety conveys a larger externality on the final goods sector the-14-
better foreign varieties substitute for each other. A similar argument applies for domestic varieties.
Alternatively, the externality can be viewed from the primal (equation 4). Symmetry implies that 
ZD ’ n
1/*
d zd ZM ’ n
1/,
m zm (27)
The cost of purchasing the output of domestic firms is  nd*zd*pzd , which increases in proportion to the
number of fimrs. But, since *<1, the effective supply to the firm increases more than proportionately with
the number of firms.
Note in the special case in which ( = * = , and zm = zd, that Zx can be written as:
Zx ’ (nd % nm)1/( zz ’ zm ’ zd (28)
in which case domestic and imported firms, while differentiated, are perfect substitutes at the margin.
A final set of assumptions needed to complete the model formulation relate to the specification of
the external sector, and in particular the endogeneity of prices.  For our purposes, we will begin with a
"small country assumption", that prices to our country are fixed.  It is clear what this means with respect to
X and Y, but less clear with respect to foreign producer services.  We assume that there are a large
number of potential foreign firms in production in the rest of the world.  A fixed cost is needed to enter the
domestic market (fm).  Foreign firms will enter up to the point where the local markup revenues cover this
fixed cost.  In other words, the domestic market has no "world" effect on the number of multinationals.  In
terms of Figure 1, the "World Markets" block exchanges X, Y and V at fixed prices.  This assumption
would generally not hold in a "large-country case", with firm level scale economies.  In such a model,
excess markup revenues contribute to firm-level fixed costs, and the number of multinational firms
becomes endogenous to policy changes in one country (Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000).6  Unlike Tarr and Rutherford [1998], this model is based on an exogenous growth rate in the
workforce.  Product variety effects are defined on a per-capita basis.
7 In this model unskilled workers are measured in units proportional to population, but skilled
workers are measured in efficiency units.  For our reference calculations we take $=10/7.
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3. Modeling Transitional Dynamics
In this section we present an extension of the static model above which we employ in the dynamic
simulations.  In this analysis we assume that liberalization of FDI in services is an unanticipated policy
reform and the economy is initially on a steady-state growth path with FDI prohibited.6  We calibrate the
dynamic model to precisely the same dataset employed to illustrate the static model.  The model assumes a
growth in new vintage labor and a utility discount factor consistent with a balanced baseline GDP growth
rate of 2% per annum and an interest rate of  5% per annum.  
Savings and investment are determined implicitly by the consumption decisions of a  forward-
looking representative agent who allocates wealth to maximize intertemporal welfare:






Consistent with a labor market in which workers enter the workforce at age 20 and retire at age
70, we assume an exogenous retirement rate of 2% per year.  Along the dynamic growth path new vintage
workers enter the labor market in each period, and they must choose whether to enter school or the
unskilled workforce.  School graduates subsequently choose either to work in the domestic or FDI service
industry.  The new-vintage labor market clearance condition, where n is the number of new workers, is:
     R t % s
$
t ’ nt (30)
in which $>1 reflects diminishing returns in the production of skilled workers, i.e. marginal graduates are
less productive than the earlier participants.7   New skilled workers (new graduates) may subsequently
choose to enter the domestic or FDI (multinational) skilled labor markets:-16-




t ’ st (31)
while the unskilled workforce likewise evolves:
     Lt%1 ’8Lt %R t (32)
We assume in the dynamic model that the cost of producing a new skilled worker for the domestic or FDI
markets is identical. 
Given a dynamic model, we have the capacity to assess the adjustment costs of workers. Cross-
country evidence on the adjustment costs of labor indicates that the social adjustment costs of trade and
FDI liberalization are typically rather low relative to the fears of policy-makers, unless there are significant
labor market distortions present.  Moreover, even the private costs of adjustment are low for workers who
were not earning rents (Matusz and Tarr, forthcoming). Restrictions on the ability of firms to terminate
labor and other labor market distortions that limit mobility, as well as a poor climate for investment (due to
macroecomic instability or lack of the rule of law) can, however, lead to prolonged periods of adjustment to
trade and FDI liberalization for labor.
 In this paper we take a proxy for these various distortions that can lead to large adjustment costs
of workers. We assume that some fraction of existing skilled workers have human capital that is specific
to the firm type in which they work and cannot be trained for the other type firms, i.e., a fraction of the
workforce is unable to gain employment in foreign firms.  (All new workers can freely choose between
domestic and multinational firms.)  The base year supply of skilled workers is then divided between those










In the central scenarios, we take  .   Subsequent to the initial reallocation of skilled workers across N’0.58 Since the skilled workers remain employed during the transition, the adjustment costs are private
not social.
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When skilled workers are immobile (  is small), there may be an initial disparity in real wages between N
workers in different types of firms during the adjustment process.8 As new skilled workers enter the
workforce, they move into the sector paying the highest return, and  wage differences between foreign and
domestic firms disappear.  The model formulation in a complementarity format does not rule out
“bang-bang” adjustment paths, so that during a transition period where (34) is binding,, all new graduates
adopt jobs in the FDI service sector. 
In differentiating domestic and multinational skilled workers, we replace equation (8) by two
equations, one for domestic workers:
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Prior to liberalization, skill-intensive services (Z) and skill-intensive goods (X) are produced using
only domestic inputs. In the long-run, following reform, both are produced using both domestic and
multinational inputs (see equation 3).  During the transition, however, the relative cost of new- versus old
production techniques determines how these goods are supplied.  During the transition, the supply of X is





















Before illustrating how the model described above can be coded into an applied general-equilibrium
model, we present a brief discussion of some important practical issues.
(a) Initially - inactive activities  Often AGE models avoid initial calibrations in which there are
no initially-inactive production activities or trade links.  Or, if there is an initially inactive trade link (aircraft
exports from Sri Lanka to the US), the link is omitted from the model: i.e., an inactive link is always
inactive.  
In our case, this is not an appropriate procedure.  We very much want to consider initial situations
in which FDI is prohibited in a sector, and liberalization opens the closed sector.  In a complementarity
framework this is not a technical difficulty. The difficulty is economic.  We would like to know how
profitable the excluded activity would be if the barrier were removed.  This will obviously be very
quantitatively important to the results, which can range from zero in a perfectly competitive model (the
barrier was redundant, the activity is not profitable with no barrier) to extremely high values.  But there are
no easily obtainable data for the "shadow price" of these restrictions.  Survey evidence from multinational
firms might be one source of information.
(b) Firm-level production differentiation  We have no good estimates of the extent to which
the outputs of firms in a given sector are good or poor substitutes for one another.  Note that in the large-
group monopolistic-competition model, the degree of production differentiation is closely related to scale
economies, or more precisely the ratio of fixed costs to average costs.  Thus if one were to take the model
seriously, one could use possible data on scale economies to estimate the elasticity of substitution among
different firms.  This estimate will of course be of considerable importance to the results: a lower elasticity-19-
of substitution implies lower externalities to the final good sector, as explained above.
(c) Differentiation by region of origin  If we really believe that the essence of production
differentiation is firm-level only, and that firms are symmetric but imperfect substitutes for one another,
then the three parameters (, *, and , in (3) and (4) should be identical.  But is it really believable that the
elasticity of substitution between two Russian management consulting firms is the same as the elasticity of
substitution between one Russian and one American firm?  In the model presented here we will assume
that * = ,, but that this number is greater than or equal to (.  Substitution across firm type (domestic and
foreign) is less than or equal to substitution within a type.
(d) Bang-Bang Solutions We have chosen a structure of production that provides for firm-type
product differentiation with national differences (see equation (3)). When the elasticities of substitution are
equal at all levels, i.e., ( = * = , , the CES function reduces to strictly firm-level product differentiation. In
this case, the final good sector is completely indifferent between a domestic of foreign variety.  Decreasing
nm by one is perfectly matched in final sector productivity by increasing nd by one; only the total number of
varieties matters. If the costs of producing domestic or foreign services are not that different, and they are
collectively a small part of total GDP, then we can get bang-bang solutions in which a small change in
relative costs shift us from only domestic services being produced to only foreign services.  This has indeed
occurred in our simulations. 
On the other hand, we have set ( less than * = , (which may be justified by economic arguments
as noted above). In this case, domestic and foreign varieties have different impacts on the productivity of
the final goods sector. The total number of varieties is not all that is important, but also the share of foreign
and domestic varieties. In particular, the marginal productivity of either the domestic or foreign aggregate
ZD and ZM goes to infinity as its share goes to zero. Then, as long as either foreign or domestic varieties
are permitted to be produced and sold, they will both exist in the market and we will not have bang-bang-20-
solutions. 
13. Simulation Results
Table 1 shows some simulation results from the static model.  In these calculations, the elasticity of
substitution among services of one firm type (domestic or multinational) is set at 5 while the elasticity of
substitution between firm types is set at 3.
The model is benchmarked such that key variables have the values of one or zero initially.  The
first column of Table 1 shows results when imports of V are banned and hence ZM is zero.  The country
exports Y and imports X, and there is no trade in V (trade balance requires that the last three entries in a
column sum to zero).  The prices for skilled and unskilled labor are real prices, the nominal price divided by
the consumer price index.
Columns 2-6 of Table 1 gives results for counterfactuals with alternative values of pv.  Some
explanation of this exercise is required and we begin first with the interpretation of alternative values of pv . 
One interpretation of pv is the international “term-of-trade” for V.  A lower pv denotes better terms of
trade insofar as how much X and/or Y the country must pay for the imported input V.  Alternatively, pv can
be interpreted as a domestic price that must be paid for imported V, with this price above the foreign supply
price due to a regulatory barrier or red tape.  The difference between pv and the foreign supply price is
captured by the foreign supplier or is dissipated on regulatory procedures or red tape.  That is, pv is the real
resource cost to the domestic economy of an imported unit of V.  From the point of view of the domestic
economy, either interpretation is the same: real resources are sacrificed in the differences between pv and
a lower foreign supply price.  Note however that this way of modeling the barrier is not equivalent to a tax
or a bribe.   In those case, the difference between pv and the foreign supply price is capture by domestic
agents, either the government or the domestic bribe taker.  -21-
Column 2 of Table 1 in which pv = 1 is a very important special case and requires some
explanation.  Let w0 and r0 be the initial equilibrium values of w and r in column 1, where foreign FDI is
banned.  For zd = zm (domestic and imported varieties produced in the same quantity), pv =1 is the value of
pv that satisfies the equality 
. cd(r0,w0)zd % fd(r0,w0) ’ cm(r0,w0,pv)zm % fm(r0,w0,pv) (39)
That is, at the initial prices with FDI-banned,  pv = 1 means that cost of one unit of output from a
representative foreign firm is equal to cost of a unit of output from a domestic firm.  This is an interesting
case because, in traditional competitive models, no entry would occur and the initial no-FDI equilibrium
would continue to be an equilibrium once entry is permitted.  However, as explained above, when foreign
and domestic varieties are differentiated, the marginal productivity of foreign varieties is unbounded in the
initial no-FDI situation. Therefore, we must have some entry by foreign firms to reduce the value of their
marginal product to their marginal costs. Given the initial high marginal productivity of the banned FDI, it
can be expected to convey a large productivity boost. 
Column 2 of Table 1 confirms that there is a strong productivity and welfare boost even at this
price of V.  An entering zm producer confers an “externality” effect on zd producers raising the price
received by an individual producer of zd for a given demand for aggregate  ZD (symmetric equation to
(17)).  Entry of more zd and/or zm firms occurs until factor prices adjust to reach a new equilibrium.  The
result in column 2 (100%) is a pure variety or productivity effect; i.e., in a competitive model without scale
economies this second column would be identical to the first.  The second column in fact shows a welfare
increase of 2.5%.  
One of the most interesting results is that the real wage of skilled labor rises by 7.0%.  This is an
effects suggested earlier, in which the substitution effect away from domestic skilled labor (V economizes
on domestic skilled labor in producing ZM) is outweighed by a scale effect.  Imported services produce a-22-
sort of productivity effect that lowers the cost of final output and increases the X-sector's direct demand
for skilled labor.  A final interesting result in the second column is change in the trade pattern.  Imports of
X are eliminated due to the economy's increased ability to produce it domestically, and trade consists of a
small export of Y to pay for imported V.
As the price of V falls, these results are amplified.  This lower price for V may be economically
reasonable, insofar as foreign multinationals have made large sunk investments and are willing to supply V
at a low marginal cost when competing with one another.  The number of domestic service firms continues
to fall as the price of V falls, but this fall in demand for domestic skilled labor is outweighed by the scale
effect in X production so that the real wage of skilled labor continues to rise.  In the right-hand column of
Table 1, the skilled-labor wage has risen by 40% while the real wage of the composite factor has fallen by
4%.  These results are particularly dramatic if we want to think of V as largely consisting of imported
skilled workers: they are clearly a general-equilibrium complement to domestic skilled labor.   
Note the reversal of the pattern of trade in goods in the right-hand two columns of Table 1.  When
V is sufficiently cheap, the country imports Y and exports X.  Finally, we might draw attention to the very
large changes in welfare in Table 1.  The model is calibrated so that imported services ZM have only a
10% value share in X production at the initial price of 1.0 for V, and V  has only a 40% value share in
producing ZM.  Thus V has a 4.0% value share in X initially.  Yet a fall in the cost of V to 20% of its initial
value produces a 14.6% increase in welfare, a result that is due to scale/variety effect.
Earlier, we noted that the entry of a new service producer confers a positive productivity boost or
“externality” on existing producers.  To put is somewhat differently, a well-known result in this type of
model is that the number of firms in market equilibrium is below the optimal number.  In Figure 2, we
therefore present results when we impose a tax/subsidy on imported V.  Figure 2 uses column five of Table
1 (Price of V is 40%), and welfare changes are measured relative to the no-tax reference point (i.e., 1.07-23-
in Table 1 is the basis for equivalent variations in income depicted in Figure 2).  Figure 2 shows that the
optimal tax on V is in fact negative, the optimum is a subsidy of about 25%.  
There are two opposing effects of a tax on V (the same would apply to a tax on zm).    Domestic
service “varieties” are produced with increasing returns, imperfect competition, and sell for a price in
excess of marginal cost.  A tax on imported services or intermediate goods induces a substitution effect in
favor of domestic “varieties”.  Each sells for a price in excess of marginal cost and so the domestic
economy captures a surplus on the extra varieties.  This effect shows up in models of differentiated final
goods and leads to a positive optimal tax.
However, in addition to this “substitution” effect there is a “scale” effect.  Imported varieties have
an “externality” effect on domestic producers at constant prices (prices do not stay constant). 
Alternatively, the extra imported varieties could be thought of as having a productivity-enhancing effect on
final production: final production exhibits increasing returns in the range of intermediates.  There is no
general theoretical result as to which effect will dominate, the latter does in this model.  But the effect is
clear in column 5 of Table 1 (pv = 0.4), the value which is used in Figure 2.  The sum of the indices for the
domestic and foreign firms is 1.53 (0.11 + 1.42), greater than the value of one in the benchmark.  The
productivity or scale effect is reflected in the fact that the real prices of both factors increase relative to
the benchmark.  A related result is found in Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994), where
the authors find that the optimal tariff on auto parts imported into Mexico is negative.  For theoretical
foundations of this problem, see Markusen (1989, 1990).
The dynamic transition could require significant changes in the labor market, as illustrated in Figure
3.  In this simulation, based on parameter values as described above, the transition to a new steady state
takes roughly 5 years.  During much of this time, new entrants to the skilled labor market choose to work
in the FDI sector.  -24-
The reason for this corner solution is indicated in Figure 4.  In the long run, the wages for skilled
workers in domestic and FDI firms are equalized, but during the transitional process, our assumption of
imperfect mobility results in substantial differences in these wages.  As indicated in the figure, liberalization
raises the return to skilled workers in the FDI sector by nearly 15% while the return to skilled workers in
the domestic sector falls monotonically over two year period before beginning to recover.  During this time
the unskilled wage rises by over 10%.
Figure 5 indicates that immediately following reform, the number of domestic firms falls by 60%,
and thereafter this number declines to 20% of the original number.  The number of multinational firms
more than compensates however, as the total number of firms in the economy increases to 20% higher
than the baseline number after 5 years.
Figure 6 indicates how trade in goods (X and Y) and imported services (V) adjust through the
transition process.  The initial impact on service-intensive trade is to produce substantial imports in X.  As
the number of FDI service firms rises, however, imports of these goods decline until, after 5 years, the
economy becomes a net exporter of X .  On the new steady-state, both X and Y are exported, and only V is
imported.
The rate of transition depends crucially on the assumed mobility of skilled workers between
domestic and multinational firms as shown in Figure 7.  When the mobile fraction increase to 60% of the
initial workforce, the return to these workers increases almost immediately.  When the fraction is smaller,
the wage of skilled workers falls and remains low for a number of years.   Our formulation does not
incorporate retraining activities, so that in the case of low mobility, our results overstate the transition costs.
These results, however, could be expected in an economy with significant labor market distortions or an
especially poor climate for investment.-25-
6.  Conclusions
Although there is a clear trend among developing countries to liberalize their policies with respect
to inward foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 1995, 272-275), many developing countries continue to
impose restraints on FDI in general and in services in particular. These policies may be motivated by the
fear that foreign service providers will harm the domestic skilled workers that provide these services in
domestic firms. For example, examination of the commitments on services of WTO members in their
GATS schedules reveals that 32 countries (mainly in Africa and Latin America) have scheduled
“horizontal restrictions” that require foreign firms to use and train domestic skilled workers. In many cases
these restraints may impede the foreign firm from importing the specialized people it would desire.  
In this paper we have examined the impact of the liberalization of policies to allow the formation of
foreign firms that provide intermediate services.  The foreign service providers import an input (which we
interpret as a composite of foreign skilled labor and specialized technology), and economize on the use of
domestic skilled labor compared to domestic firms that provide the substitute service.
 We first examined this issue with a comparative static model and showed that liberalization could
lead to gains between 3 and 15 percent of GDP, depending on parameter assumptions. These are very
large gains relative to what we might expect from a comparative static model. The source of these large
gains is that additional intermediate service firms increase the productivity of the final goods sector that
uses these firms services as intermediate inputs. More service firms allow final goods producers to use
more specialized expertise, in the same way that larger markets allow for more specialized machine tools.
We have also constructed a dynamic model, which allows us to assess the transition path to a new
steady state growth path and the adjustment costs. In our model, while the total number of firms and total
factor productivity in the economy increases steadily from the first period, for the first 5 years the domestic
industry progressively declines. Consequently, all new domestic entrants to the skilled labor force enter-26-
foreign firms, where real wages are higher for the first 5 years. Eventually the domestic industry stabilizes
(the marginal product of domestic firms increases as the number of domestic firms declines). The potential
losers during the transition are skilled workers in the domestic industry. These workers incur losses only
when we make rather strong assumptions regarding the immobility of skilled workers and we assume that
their human capital is specific to domestic firms and that only new entrants to the workforce can be trained
to work in the foreign owned firms. When we assume that 50% of the workforce is immobile, after 5 years 
real wages of skilled workers are equalized across foreign and domestic owned service firms and are
higher as a result of the liberalization of FDI in the service sector.
One of the more interesting results of the comparative static model is that the real wage of
domestic skilled labor increases with liberalization of policies against foreign service providers, and the
more foreign firms there are in the domestic market the more the real wage of domestic skilled workers
increases. Thus, despite the fact that foreign firms import an input (V) and thereby use domestic skilled
labor less intensively than domestic firms, additional foreign firms benefit domestic skilled labor. The
reason is that additional foreign firms lower the cost of the intermediate service product in final goods
production and thereby increase the relative importance of the final good sector (X), which uses services
relatively intensively. Thus, in a general equilibrium sense, domestic skilled labor and the specialized foreign
input V are complements. One possible interpretation of this result is that the policies of certain developing
countries discussed above that restrain the import of foreign inputs or force foreign multinationals to use
domestic skilled factors in place of foreign inputs may not only result in lost national income, but may hurt
the factor of production they are designed to assist.-27-
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Figure 1:  Real Flows in the EconomyPRICE OF V  (units of foreign exchange)*
  + inf 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20
VARIABLES
Welfare 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.15
Real wage of 
skilled labor 1.00 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.40
Real wage of 
composite factor 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.96
No. of domestic
service firms 1.00 0.45 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.03
No. of foreign 
service firms 0.00 0.51 0.67 0.98 1.42 2.80
Net imports of X 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.41 -0.63 -3.01
Net imports of Y -1.00 -0.26 -0.31 0.00 0.11 2.18
Net imports of V 0.00 0.26 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.83
*To interpret the price of V, the export of one unit of Y earns one unit of foreign exchange, 
and the export of X earns 0.95 units of foreign exchange
Table 1:  Simulations for various prices of V, the imported input for FDI 
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VFigure 7:  Mobility and the Wages of Skilled Workers in Domestic Sector
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